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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEPHEN R. SMITH, JR., 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
DOROTHY K. BATCHELOR, et al, 
Defendants/Respondents 
Case No. 900153 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendants agree with Plaintiff's Statement of Jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendants agree with Plaintiff!s Statement of the Nature of 
Proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
With respect to the issues presented for appeal in this case, 
the Defendants agree that those are the issues. 
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
Defendants agree with Plaintiff's description of the 
Disposition in the Court Below. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendants dispute the Appellant's Statement of the Facts in 
that they believe that their Answers to Interrogatories and 
Answers to Request for Admissions should have been allowed and 
that such Answers were materially different than the facts set 
forth herein. 
Because however, the Court admitted those facts and its 
admission therein is the subject of Defendants1 appeal in a 
related case, 900157, Defendants will not address those facts 
within the context of this appeal, but will simply address the 
issues of the applicability of the Federal law and whether or not 
Plaintiff was entitled to attorney's fees. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
No matter how Plaintiff cleverly couches his appeal, he is 
attempting to collect twice for the same cause of action under 
both State and Federal statutes. 
In this case Plaintiff sought to recover wages and because 
the Court, in equity, saw through Plaintiff's attempt to collect 
twice with respect to the decision on the amount of damages, 
rendered the appropriate decision and should be sustained with 
respect to its determination not to allow recover under Federal 
statutes or award attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ACTED PROPERLY WITHIN ITS 
DISCRETION AND AS A COURT OF EQUITY IN DISALLOWING 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR DAMAGES UNDER FEDERAL LAW 
AND FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Plaintiff initially made a demand for $2,657.95 in back wages 
from the Defendants. Presumably, the Plaintiff as an attorney, 
knew that his claim should have included the entire amount of 
wages, whether for regular hours or overtime hours. In any event 
he did not seek to delineate the difference. 
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In the Plaintiff's Request for Admissions, which were 
answered late and pursuant to an Affidavit which he filed, he 
increased the amount to $3,544.80, which of course was different 
from the amount set forth in Plaintiff's original notice, but the 
Court allowed him to do so and allowed that amount to be fixed as 
the total amount of wages, whether regular or overtime hours to 
be paid him, based upon the Court's granting of the Summary 
Judgment for failure of the Defendants to respond to the 
Admissions. 
The Court then found, pursuant to the admitted facts, that 
Plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of the liquidated damages 
provision of the Utah Code, 34-28-5(2), which allows the Plaintiff 
to collect up to sixty (60) days of his base pay, following 
notice, if he is not paid his demand. 
In effect, had the Defendants acceded to Plaintiff's demand, 
Plaintiff would have only been entitled to recover $2,657.95 and 
would not have been allowed to recover attorney's fees, so the 
Plaintiff has had the benefit of an increase of approximately $900 
after filing this suit in adding to his claim in which Plaintiff 
combined both regular and overtime hours as wages under the Utah 
statute and received an additional $4,000 as a result of the Court 
giving him the total amount of the Utah Code Liquidated Damages 
provision. 
Plaintiff is correct when he claims that this same action is 
also covered by the Federal statute, but the statute cannot be 
manipulated as to allow Plaintiff to collect twice for the same 
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cause. The Federal statute allows for the payment of overtime 
hours and under certain circumstances, liquidated damages. In 
effect, the Plaintiff gave the Court his total hours, including 
overtime, and made his demand for wages. Had Plaintiff really 
believed that he had overtime hours coming, that demand would have 
been made clear, both in the notice to the Defendants which 
triggered the Utah Statute and to the Court. Neither of these 
were done until the appeal. 
In addition, Plaintiff received liquidated damages under the 
Utah statute and the Court apparently felt inequity that he was 
not entitled to any additional liquidated damages. Plaintiff is 
simply seeking to recover twice for the same debt and cannot do 
so. He elected his remedy under the State statute by virtue of 
the type of notice that he filed initiating the action pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated, Section 34-28 et. seq., and therefore, is 
barred from any additional recovery. 
With respect to the issue of attorney!s fees, it is true that 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 34-27-1 allows for the awarding of 
attorney's fees in suits for wages where the employee prevails. 
However, as in any statute awarding these kinds of fees, the award 
is discretionary with the Court and must be considered in equity. 
The Utah Courts have recognized this in the case of Pearce v. 
Anagnostakis, 394 P.2d 74 (1964), when in a case where a waitress 
recovered certain wages in an employer dispute she was not awarded 
attorney's fees because the Court found that her original demand 
far exceeded what she was entitled to. 
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Clearly, the Court was given equity powers here to tailor the 
attorney's fees, if any, to the circumstances to the case. 
Plaintiff's most interesting argument with respect to attorney's 
fees unfortunately concentrates on an issue that is not the 
gravamen of this case. Plaintiff suggests that because the 
statute "mandates attorney's fees", that the real issue is whether 
having served as his own attorney he can successfully argue for 
attorney's fees. 
Plaintiff's argument is one of equity and indeed he misses 
the point that equity and discretion of the Trial Court are 
present in any consideration of any award of attorney's fees, 
mandated by statute or by case law. 
The Court is referenced to the excellent ALR 4th Article in 
73 ALR 4th, 938, which discusses an Arizona case Continental v. 
Brgckbank, 152 Arizona 537 (1986), the precise issue to be decided 
was whether Paralegal costs itemized by attorney's as a portion 
of attorney's costs to be awarded to the prevailing party in a 
class action property damage case could be considered by the Trial 
Court. 
The case gives an excellent review of the equitable and 
discretionary considerations that are incumbent upon a Court in 
awarding attorney's fees, even under statutes which allow for 
attorney's fees as did the particular Arizona statute in question. 
In the body of the decision the Court states as follows: 
"Finally we reiterate and emphasis the 
discretionary power of the Trial Courts in 
awarding attorney's fees under ARS Section 
12-341.01." (Id at 936) 
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The ALR notation follows with the following language: 
11
 As is generally the case with attorney fs fee 
awards the allowance and assessments of fees 
in a particular case is a matter within the 
sound discretion of the Trial Judge.11 (Id at 
946) 
a position which has been universally applied in all 
jurisdictions. 
With the exception of the previously cited case the Utah 
Supreme Court has not spoken directly on this issue and Respondent 
believes that it because the principle is so widely accepted in 
the Trial Courts of this State, that under any statute allowing 
for or mandating attorney's fees, the Court may, within the sound 
discretion, analyze the need for attorney's fees based upon a 
number of elements, the reasonableness of the demand, the work 
required, the recovery and other considerations. 
In this case it is clear that while Judge Cornaby did not 
make specific findings on this issue (parenthetically it should 
be noted that it was the Plaintiff who prepared the Findings and 
conveniently did not make specific findings for the Judge in this 
particular instance), he certainly considered the fact that the 
Plaintiff was representing himself, that the matter was resolved 
in summary fashion, without any hearing or the taking of evidence 
and that the Plaintiff was in fact, collecting for wages he 
claimed and received approximately $1000 more than his original 
notice to the Defendants and received $4000 in what can only be 
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termed as liquidated or punitive type damages. Under its 
equitable powers, the Court could certainly have concluded, as it 
did, that award no attorney's fees was equitable under either 
State or Federal statutes. 
As noted above, because Defendants do not believe that 
Federal statutes would even be applicable in this case, there is 
no need to discuss the merits or non-merits of the attorney fees 
provision there. 
There are many questions raised by Plaintiff's lawsuit in 
this case. Unfortunately, because Defendants were poorly 
represented and allowed Plaintiff to seize the advantage 
procedurally many issues concerning Plaintiff's dual role as both 
attorney and computer technician, the advice he gave the 
Defendants, their reliance upon his opinions as to what his status 
actually was, were never raised, but should be the subject of a 
remand and a full evidentiary hearing is requested in the appeal 
filed directly by the Defendants in Case No. 900157. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in handling these types of cases 
has recently demonstrated in a number of decision, particularly 
in the domestic relations area, that in the absence of specific 
findings they will remand the case for the same. 
Here it is the Plaintiff who failed to submit to the Court 
specific findings in this area so that the Court's total reasoning 
is not clear. On the one hand Plaintiff should not be allowed to 
benefit from his own negligence in making illusory findings. On 
the other hand, Defendants believe that the entire case should be 
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remanded and so that this could be a full evidentiary hearing on 
all matters. 
This Court is still bound, even though this is a Summary 
Judgment proceeding, to accept the findings of the Trial Judge, 
unless shown to be clearly erroneous. On this particular issue, 
the issue of the double recovery sought under Federal law and the 
issue of attorney !s fees, there has been no showing by the 
Plaintiff that the Trial Court was clearly erroneous in its 
findings and certainly if there is a question as to the specific 
factual findings made by the Court, Plaintiff should not be able 
to benefit because he failed to submit such findings to the Court 
or to request them and therefore, Plaintiff!s appeal should be 
denied or at the very least, remanded so that appropriate findings 
can be made on all issues. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court was fully apprised in this case of 
Plaintiff's desire to recover under both State and Federal law and 
the exercise of its sound discretion and with a view towards 
equity, the Court allowed Plaintiff recovery under the State 
statute which provided recovery for the full amount of wages 
claimed, including overtime as set forth in his own pleadings and 
allowed him liquidated damages of two (2) months wages. The Court 
also denied attorney's fees. 
While Defendants believe that no award should have been made, 
that matter is the subject of the collateral appeal and with 
respect to this particular decision, the Defendants believe that 
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this Court should uphold the Trial Court insofar as it did not 
allow Plaintiff recovery under Federal law or for attorney's fees. 
That said decision was within the sound discretion of the 
Court and was not arbitrary, capricious or clearly erroneous and 
therefore, the Court's decision should not be changed. 
In the event however, this Court questions the basis for the 
Trial Court!s decision, it should be noted that the Findings of 
Fact were prepared by Plaintiff and the fact that more precise 
findings were not made and the case at the very least should be 
remanded to have such findings made Ja^fore this Court rules, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this y >Q^tfay)of July, 1990, 
JOHN TL CMNI 
Attorney for Defendants 
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